Zotrus Trusted Root ProgramEffective Date: April 20, 2022 Last Updated: November 16, 2026

1. Overview

The Zotrus Trusted Root Program (the “Program”) defines the requirements and procedures for the inclusion and continued recognition of Root Certification Authorities (Root CAs), subordinate CAs and their certificate services within the trust environments operated or recognized by Zotrus.

The Program establishes one unified root trust framework for multiple certificate purposes, cryptographic algorithms and two application ecosystems: ZT Browser and ZTmail App.

1.1 Application Ecosystems

  • ZTmail App: supports trust in S/MIME email certificates, PDF document certificates and timestamping certificates. Its trusted roots are managed within the Zotrus trust environment; ZTmail App does not rely on operating-system or third-party root trust lists.
  • ZT Browser: supports trust in TLS/SSL website certificates and, through its built-in PDF reader, trust evaluation of PDF document certificates and timestamping certificates. For RSA/ECC website certificates, ZT Browser relies on the Chromium built-in root store and operating-system trust stores. Zotrus manages SM2 website trust roots and related SM2 Certificate Transparency (CT) log trust.

The Doc and TSA Trust Bits apply to both ZT Browser and ZTmail App. The Email Trust Bit applies to ZTmail App, while the SSL Trust Bit applies to ZT Browser.

1.2 Trust Bits

Trust BitCertificate purposeApplication ecosystem
SSLTLS/SSL website certificatesZT Browser
EmailS/MIME email certificatesZTmail App
DocPDF document certificatesZT Browser; ZTmail App
TSATimestamping authority certificates and timestamp servicesZT Browser; ZTmail App

A single Root CA may be approved for one or more Trust Bits. Each requested Trust Bit is evaluated independently against the requirements applicable to that certificate purpose. Approval for one Trust Bit does not automatically grant approval for another.

1.3 Unified Root Trust Framework

  • The Program uses one unified Root CAs trust framework. Roots supporting different algorithms and certificate purposes may coexist in the same root list.
  • Trust Bits indicate the certificate purposes for which a Root CA and its hierarchy have been approved; they do not create separate root lists by algorithm.
  • A Root CA may support multiple Trust Bits and both application ecosystems, subject to the relevant technical, policy and operational requirements.
  • The trust status of a root, subordinate CA or certificate purpose may differ between Zotrus-managed trust and third-party trust stores. Inclusion by another root program does not automatically constitute inclusion by Zotrus.

2. Basic Obligations

The following obligations apply to every CA operator participating in the Program, regardless of cryptographic algorithm or requested Trust Bit.

  • The CA must provide services that offer broad and demonstrable value to users of the relevant Zotrus application ecosystem.
  • The CA must notify Zotrus of any anticipated or actual change in control or ownership of the CA operator, Root CA or any subordinate CA included in, or proposed for inclusion in, the Program. Inclusion in the Program is not transferable.
  • The CA must operate its certificate services in accordance with this Program, its disclosed Certificate Policy (CP), Certification Practice Statement (CPS), applicable standards and the representations made in its application.
  • The CA must maintain accurate, current and publicly accessible CP/CPS documentation sufficient for Zotrus and relying parties to understand the CA’s practices and assess compliance with applicable requirements.
  • The CA must cooperate with reasonable information requests, compliance reviews, audit follow-ups and investigations conducted by Zotrus.
  • The CA must maintain appropriate security controls for its CA systems, networks, facilities, personnel, cryptographic keys and third-party dependencies.
  • The CA must promptly inform Zotrus of material changes that may affect the security, compliance, trustworthiness or scope of its approved certificate services.

3. Program Requirements (RSA | SM2)

This section sets out the qualifications, audit, policy and technical requirements for CAs seeking approval under the Program. Requirements are organized by cryptographic algorithm where differences apply. Requirements for a particular Trust Bit apply only when that Trust Bit is requested or used.

3.1 CAs Using RSA/ECC Algorithms

  • The CA must undergo an annual independent audit under WebTrust Principles and Criteria for Certification Authorities (preferred), or ETSI EN 319 411-1 LCP, NCP or NCP+ (considered case by case).
  • For Root CAs and subordinate CAs issuing TLS/SSL certificates, the annual audit must cover WebTrust for CAs and WebTrust for CAs – SSL Baseline with Network Security (preferred), or ETSI EN 319 411-1 LCP and (DVCP or OVCP), considered case by case.
  • For Root CAs and subordinate CAs issuing EV TLS/SSL certificates, the annual audit must cover WebTrust for CAs, WebTrust for CAs – SSL Baseline with Network Security, and WebTrust for CAs – Extended Validation SSL (preferred), or ETSI EN 319 411-1 NCP and EVCP, considered case by case.
  • The CA must maintain and follow its CP and CPS.
  • For TLS/SSL certificates, the CA must comply with applicable CA/Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements. For EV TLS/SSL certificates, it must also comply with applicable CA/Browser Forum EV Guidelines.
  • Certificate Policy OIDs and certificate profiles must comply with applicable CA/Browser Forum-defined OIDs and requirements, where such definitions exist. Refer to the CA/Browser Forum Object Registry.
  • For RSA/ECC Root CAs used for PDF document digital signing and timestamp signing, the Root CA must be trusted by the Adobe Approved Trust List (AATL) as a prerequisite for applying for the Doc and TSA Trust Bits. AATL inclusion does not guarantee inclusion in the Zotrus Trusted Root Program or pre-trust by Zotrus. Zotrus independently evaluates each application and determines whether to include the Root CA and approve the requested Trust Bits.

3.2 CAs Using SM2 Algorithms

  • For SM2 SSL/TLS certificate services, the CA must hold valid CA licenses issued by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) of China and the State Cryptography Administration (SCA) of China, and operate its own SM2 Root CA or an SM2 subordinate CA issued by the SCA operated SM2 Root CA.
  • If a CA does not hold the licenses described above, its application for SM2 SSL/TLS services may be considered case by case if it provides an annual WebTrust audit report and has at least one RSA/ECC Root CA included in the root program of Microsoft, Mozilla, Google or Apple.
  • SM2 Root CAs or subordinate CAs used for PDF document signing and timestamp signing in either ZT Browser or ZTmail App must hold applicable valid Chinese CA licenses.
  • Except where SM2-specific requirements are stated, the requirements applicable to RSA/ECC CAs also apply to SM2 CAs, with necessary differences for the cryptographic algorithm and certificate profiles.

3.3 Common Certificate Policy and Hierarchy Requirements

  • The CA must disclose all subordinate CAs that chain to each Root CA submitted for inclusion, including technically constrained and unconstrained subordinate CAs, and identify the certificate purposes and Trust Bits for which each subordinate CA is used.
  • The CA must ensure that the certificate hierarchy and certificate profiles are consistent with the applicable CP/CPS, audit scope and requested Trust Bits.
  • Where CA/Browser Forum requirements define applicable certificate policy OIDs, the CA must use the OIDs specified by those requirements or by this Program. All CA-specific custom OIDs are not accepted.

3.4 S/MIME Email Certificate Requirements

The requirements in this section apply to S/MIME email certificates trusted by ZTmail. “Email certificates” include both digital signing certificates and encryption certificates used for email. The Key Usage extension distinguishes signing certificates from encryption certificates. S/MIME certificates automatically configured by ZTmail are available in three types: signing-only certificates, encryption-only certificates, and dual-purpose certificates for both signing and encryption.

The Certificate Policies extension of each end-entity S/MIME email certificate must contain the OID corresponding to its identity validation type. Zotrus identity mapping is T1 = MV, T2 = IV, T3 = OV and T4 = SV.

For RSA/ECC S/MIME certificates, the following corresponding CA/Browser Forum Multipurpose or Strict OID must be used. Legacy OIDs are not accepted.

Zotrus Trust LevelS/MIME Identity TypeMultipurpose OIDStrict OID
T1MV – Mailbox Validated2.23.140.1.5.1.22.23.140.1.5.1.3
T2IV – Individual Validated2.23.140.1.5.4.22.23.140.1.5.4.3
T3OV – Organization Validated2.23.140.1.5.2.22.23.140.1.5.2.3
T4SV – Sponsor Validated2.23.140.1.5.3.22.23.140.1.5.3.3

For SM2 S/MIME certificates, only Zotrus-defined OIDs are accepted. CA/Browser Forum OIDs apply to certificates issued in compliance with the applicable CA/Browser Forum requirements, which are designed for RSA/ECC certificates and are not applicable to SM2 certificates under this Program.

Zotrus Trust LevelS/MIME Identity TypeZotrus-defined SM2 OID
T1MV – Mailbox Validated1.2.156.157933.31
T2IV – Individual Validated1.2.156.157933.32
T3OV – Organization Validated1.2.156.157933.33
T4SV – Sponsor Validated1.2.156.157933.34

3.5 Document Certificate Requirements

These requirements apply to document certificates trusted by both ZT Browser and ZTmail App. The term “document certificates” covers certificates used for signing and encrypting both PDF and OFD documents. The Key Usage extension distinguishes signing certificates from encryption certificates. Document certificates automatically configured by ZTmail Sign are available in two types: signing-only certificates and encryption-only certificates.

The Certificate Policies extension of each end-entity document certificate must contain the OID corresponding to its identity validation type. Zotrus identity mapping is T1 = MV, T2 = IV, T3 = OV and T4 = SV.

Given that the CA/Browser Forum has not yet published Baseline Requirements for document certificates, so the document certificates should comply with the ISO 32000 series of standards and be identified through the id-kp-documentSigning EKU OID 1.3.6.1.5.5.7.3.36.

For RSA/ECC document certificates, the corresponding CA/Browser Forum Multipurpose OID or Zotrus-defined OID listed below must be used. S/MIME certificate Legacy OIDs and Strict OID are not accepted.

Zotrus Trust LevelDocument Certificate Identity TypeS/MIME Multipurpose OIDZotrus-defined OID
T1MV – Mailbox Validated2.23.140.1.5.1.21.3.6.1.4.1.57933.41
T2IV – Individual Validated2.23.140.1.5.4.21.3.6.1.4.1.57933.42
T3OV – Organization Validated2.23.140.1.5.2.21.3.6.1.4.1.57933.43
T4SV – Sponsor Validated2.23.140.1.5.3.21.3.6.1.4.1.57933.44

For SM2 document certificates, only Zotrus-defined OIDs are accepted. CA/Browser Forum OIDs apply to certificates issued in compliance with the applicable CA/Browser Forum requirements, which are designed for RSA/ECC certificates and are not applicable to SM2 certificates under this Program. CA-defined custom OIDs are not accepted.

Zotrus Trust LevelIdentity typeZotrus-defined OID
T1MV – Mailbox Validated1.2.156.157933.41
T2IV – Individual Validated1.2.156.157933.42
T3OV – Organization Validated1.2.156.157933.43
T4SV – Sponsor Validated1.2.156.157933.44

3.6 Timestamping Certificate Requirements

The TSA Trust Bit applies to both ZT Browser and ZTmail App. Timestamping certificates and services approved under this Trust Bit may be used by both applications to establish trust in timestamps associated with digitally signed documents.

CAs applying for the TSA Trust Bit must identify the policy OID used for timestamping certificates in the Certificate Policies extension either CA/Browser Forum-defined OID or Zotrus-defined OID. CA-defined custom OIDs are not accepted.

OID sourceCertificate Policy OIDNotes
CA/Browser Forum2.23.140.1.4.2Timestamp Certificate OID for RSA/ECC algorithm certificates listed under Code Signing requirements.
Zotrus1.3.6.1.4.1.57933.2.6.1Zotrus-defined TSA OID for RSA/ECC algorithm certificates
Zotrus1.2.156.57933.2.6.1Zotrus-defined TSA OID for SM2 algorithm certificates

The CA/Browser Forum OID above identifies a timestamp certificate policy OID only. Its use does not, by itself, establish that a TSA or timestamp service complies with all CA/Browser Forum Code Signing Baseline Requirements.

3.7 TLS/SSL Certificate Requirements

RSA/ECC TLS/SSL certificates must include one of the following CA/Browser Forum-defined Certificate Policy OIDs in the Certificate Policies extension.

Zotrus Trust LevelIdentity typeCABF-defined OID
T1DV – Domain Validated2.23.140.1.2.1
T2IV – Individual Validated2.23.140.1.2.3
T3OV – Organization Validated2.23.140.1.2.2
T4EV – Extended Validation2.23.140.1.1

SM2 algorithm SSL certificates must include the SM2 SSL certificate policy OIDs in the Certificate Policies extension defined by China Cryptography Standardization Technical Committee (CCSTC) or, prior to its definition, the OIDs defined by Zotrus.

Zotrus Trust LevelSSL/TLS certificate typeCCSTC-defined OIDZotrus-defined OID
T1DV – Domain Validated1.2.156.10197.6.4.1.4.11.2.156.157933.11
T2IV – Individual Validated1.2.156.10197.6.4.1.4.21.2.156.157933.12
T3OV – Organization Validated1.2.156.10197.6.4.1.4.31.2.156.157933.13
T4EV – Extended Validation1.2.156.10197.6.4.1.4.41.2.156.157933.14

Certificate Transparency (CT) Requirements (SM2):

CAs are encouraged to follow the requirements below. However, the effective date and implementation details for mandatory enforcement will be announced in a subsequent update.

For certificates that do not contain the required trusted SCTs, ZT Browser currently only displays the status “Certificate Not Transparency”.

  • SM2 SSL certificates must support the SM2 Certificate Transparency mechanism, in compliance with the China cryptography industry standard "Certificate Transparency System Framework."
  • SM2 SSL certificates must contain SCT data issued by SM2 Certificate Transparency log systems trusted by ZT Browser.
  • One SCT for DV SSL certificates, and two SCTs for OV and EV certificates.

3.8 Intranet TLS/SSL Certificate Requirements

Publicly trusted TLS certificate standards prohibit internal names and reserved IP addresses in publicly trusted certificates. Internal web systems may nevertheless require HTTPS protection. Zotrus therefore provides a separate trust policy for Intranet TLS/SSL certificates.

An Intranet TLS/SSL certificate is a certificate whose Subject Alternative Name (SAN) contains one or more internal names and/or reserved IP addresses.

  • A dedicated Root CA must be used for Intranet SSL certificates. A public SSL Root CA must not be used for this purpose.
  • The Subject CN and SAN field must contain a public Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN), which is used to validate domain ownership in accordance with the applicable CA/Browser Forum TLS Baseline Requirements.
  • The SAN must contain at least one internal name or reserved IP address. Validation of the internal name or reserved IP address is not required. Any public domain name or public IP address included in the SAN must be validated.
  • The certificate validity period must be between one and five years.
  • Certificate Transparency is optional for Intranet SSL certificates. SCTs may be included but are not mandatory.
Zotrus Trust LevelSSL/TLS certificate typeZotrus OID for SM2 certificatesZotrus OID for RSA/ECC certificates
T1DV – Domain Validated1.2.156.157933.811.3.6.1.4.1.57933.81
T2IV – Individual Validated1.2.156.157933.821.3.6.1.4.1.57933.82
T3OV – Organization Validated1.2.156.157933.831.3.6.1.4.1.57933.83
T4EV – Extended Validation1.2.156.157933.841.3.6.1.4.1.57933.84

If a certificate contains one of the specified Intranet SSL OIDs but does not meet the applicable requirements, ZT Browser will display it as “Not secure”.

4. Certificate Lifecycle Management

Approval under the Program is not limited to the initial inclusion of a Root CA. The CA must maintain the security, auditability and compliance of the approved certificate hierarchy throughout its lifecycle.

4.1 Certificate Hierarchy Inventory and Disclosure

  • The CA must maintain a complete and current inventory of each included Root CA and all subordinate CA certificates that chain to it, including the certificate subject, issuer, serial number, validity period, public key, signature algorithm, constraints, intended certificate purposes and applicable Trust Bits.
  • The CA must notify Zotrus before placing any newly created or newly deployed subordinate CA under an included Root CA into production, and must provide the certificate and relevant supporting information for review.
  • No newly created subordinate CA may be treated as approved for a Trust Bit merely because it chains to an included Root CA. Approval is limited to the hierarchy and Trust Bits expressly accepted by Zotrus.
  • The CA must maintain records of issuance, renewal, suspension and revocation for CA certificates and end-entity certificates as required by applicable standards and its CP/CPS.

4.2 Audit Continuity and Scope

  • The CA must maintain the applicable annual independent audits required by Section 3. Audit periods for successive period-of-time audits must be contiguous, without unexplained gaps.
  • The audit scope must cover each included Root CA and every subordinate CA that is technically capable of issuing certificates within the approved hierarchy, unless an applicable standard or Zotrus-approved exception provides otherwise.
  • When a new subordinate CA is created, the CA must ensure that it is brought within the applicable audit scope in accordance with the relevant audit framework and must provide supporting evidence to Zotrus on request.
  • The CA must provide updated audit reports, audit opinions, management responses and remediation evidence when available or when reasonably requested by Zotrus.

4.3 CP/CPS Maintenance and Change Control

  • The CA must keep its CP/CPS current and publicly available. The documentation must describe its practices in a clear, specific and auditable manner, including certificate issuance, validation, revocation, status services, key management and relevant third-party services.
  • The CA must notify Zotrus of material changes to its CP/CPS, certificate profiles, policy OIDs, validation methods, issuing hierarchy, key management arrangements, audit status, service providers or operational controls.
  • The CA must identify the effective date and scope of each material change and provide revised documentation or a change summary sufficient for Zotrus to assess its impact on approved Trust Bits.
  • The CA must not use a CP/CPS update or operational change to expand the scope of an approved Trust Bit without Zotrus review where the change materially affects the trust basis or certificate profile.

4.4 Key Management and Security Maintenance

  • The CA must maintain documented controls for the generation, protection, use, backup, recovery, rotation and destruction of Root CA and subordinate CA private keys.
  • The CA must maintain evidence of key generation ceremonies and key lifecycle controls, including appropriate dual control, access restrictions and HSM safeguards where applicable.
  • The CA must promptly notify Zotrus of any suspected or confirmed compromise, loss of control, unauthorized use or material security weakness affecting a CA private key or certificate hierarchy.
  • The CA must maintain appropriate technical and organizational controls to protect CA systems, certificate issuance systems, validation systems, revocation services, repositories and supporting infrastructure.

4.5 Certificate Status, Revocation and Service Continuity

  • The CA must operate certificate status and revocation services in accordance with applicable standards and its CP/CPS, and keep the relevant CRL, OCSP or other status information accurate and available.
  • The CA must promptly revoke or otherwise invalidate certificates when required by applicable standards, its CP/CPS or a security incident, and must preserve evidence of the action taken.
  • The CA must notify Zotrus of material service outages, failures or changes affecting certificate issuance, renewal, revocation, status checking or the trustworthiness of the approved hierarchy.
  • Where a CA service is discontinued, transferred or materially changed, the CA must coordinate with Zotrus on the impact to relying parties and the continued status of the applicable Trust Bits.

4.6 Periodic Review and Continued Eligibility

  • Zotrus may periodically review the CA’s continued compliance, audit status, CP/CPS, certificate hierarchy, security posture and user value.
  • The CA must respond to reasonable requests for updated evidence and must remediate identified deficiencies within the period specified by Zotrus, taking into account severity and risk.
  • Failure to maintain the requirements for a Trust Bit may result in restriction, suspension or removal of that Trust Bit, without necessarily affecting other independently approved Trust Bits.

5. Submission Process

CAs seeking inclusion of a Root CA or subordinate CA in the Zotrus Trusted Root Program should:

  • Download and complete the Zotrus Trusted Root Program application form.
  • Submit the application form together with the CA’s legal/company name, registered address and contact information for an authorized representative.
  • Identify each Root CA and subordinate CA for which inclusion is requested, the cryptographic algorithm used, the requested Trust Bit(s), the application ecosystem(s), and the certificate purposes supported.
  • Provide the Root CA certificate and relevant certificate hierarchy information, including all subordinate CAs chaining to the Root CA.
  • Provide current CP/CPS documentation and applicable audit reports or audit statements covering the requested certificate services.
  • Provide relevant certificate profiles, Certificate Policy OIDs, revocation/status service information and evidence of applicable technical requirements.
  • Provide a test website, signed email and/or test signed PDF document by the certificates for which trust is requested, where applicable. For document encryption use cases, provide suitable test material or a test procedure.
  • Provide any additional information reasonably requested by Zotrus to assess the application.

After receiving the application, Zotrus will review the submitted information and may request additional documentation, evidence or technical information. Zotrus will contact the applicant regarding the review, any deficiencies and further steps.

An application is not approved until Zotrus has completed its review and communicated its decision. Submission of an application, possession of a certificate included in another root program, or compliance with an external trust program does not create entitlement to inclusion.

6. Root Acceptance

Zotrus reserves the right, at its sole discretion, to accept, reject, suspend, restrict or remove any Root CA or subordinate CA from the Zotrus Trusted Root Program. Zotrus may prioritize applications based on user needs, ecosystem requirements, security considerations and the completeness of the submitted information.

  • RSA/ECC Root CAs trusted by Chromium may be recognized by ZT Browser through the Chromium built-in root store. Operating-system trust stores may also contribute to RSA/ECC website trust. The availability of such trust may change without notice as a result of changes made by Chromium or operating system vendors.
  • SM2 Root CAs and their subordinate CAs must satisfy the applicable Chinese licensing and root issuance requirements in this Program. Exceptions may be considered case by case where expressly stated.
  • A CA’s inclusion is limited to the Root CA, subordinate CAs and Trust Bits approved by Zotrus. Inclusion for one Trust Bit does not imply approval for other Trust Bits.
  • All ZT Browser trusted Root CA operators are eligible to apply for the Zotrus Website Trusted Identity Validation service. Subject to applicable arrangements, validation data may be synchronized to the Zotrus trusted website database, allowing ZT Browser to display the corresponding website identity validation level.
  • For ZT Browser, the Program also governs trust in PDF document certificates and timestamping certificates used by its built-in PDF reader. The Doc and TSA Trust Bits determine whether the relevant certificate hierarchies are trusted for real-time PDF signature and timestamp verification.
  • For ZTmail App, trusted roots are managed within the Zotrus trust environment. The Root CAs list may contain roots supporting different certificate purposes and cryptographic algorithms; the approved Trust Bits determine the purposes for which each root is trusted.

Zotrus may impose conditions on inclusion, limit trust to specific certificate purposes or application ecosystems, require remediation, or defer a decision pending further evidence. Zotrus is not required to enable every Trust Bit requested by an applicant.

Following the completion of the root certificate acceptance process, the timing of its inclusion in ZT Browser and ZTmail App will be determined in accordance with the respective software release schedules. Zotrus does not guarantee or commit to any specific release date or timeframe for making the approved root certificate available in these applications.

7. Incident Reporting

Any failure by a CA to comply with this Program, its disclosed CP/CPS, applicable audit requirements or certificate standards may be treated as an incident. Incidents include, but are not limited to, mis-issuance, failure of validation procedures, unauthorized issuance, CA key compromise, security breaches, material service failures, audit deficiencies and failure to maintain required documentation.

7.1 Reporting to Zotrus

  • The CA must report incidents to Zotrus without undue delay after becoming aware of them, and must not wait until an investigation is complete before making an initial report.
  • The initial report should identify the affected CA certificate(s), hierarchy, certificate purpose(s), Trust Bit(s), incident discovery time, known scope and immediate containment measures.
  • The CA must provide a complete incident report, including relevant facts, affected certificates and relying parties where known, impact assessment, root-cause analysis, remediation measures, preventive actions and supporting evidence.
  • The CA must provide material updates as the investigation progresses and respond to follow-up questions or requests for evidence from Zotrus.

7.2 Security and Vulnerability Incidents

  • Suspected or confirmed compromise, loss of control or unauthorized use of a Root CA or subordinate CA private key must be reported immediately through the incident channel designated by Zotrus.
  • A serious vulnerability or security incident affecting CA systems, certificate issuance, validation, revocation or status services must be reported even if no certificate mis-issuance has been identified.
  • Where an incident is also subject to public disclosure or reporting obligations under applicable root programs, the CA remains responsible for meeting those obligations independently of its report to Zotrus.

7.3 Remediation and Zotrus Response

Zotrus may take appropriate action based on the nature, severity and impact of the incident, including requesting remediation, requiring a corrective action plan with milestones, requesting additional audit evidence, limiting the applicable Trust Bits, suspending trust or removing the affected Root CA or subordinate CA from the Program.

The CA must track remediation actions to completion and provide reasonably sufficient evidence for Zotrus to determine whether the incident has been resolved. Zotrus may keep a Trust Bit restricted or suspended until it is satisfied that the underlying issue has been adequately addressed.

8. Policy Updates and Maintenance

Zotrus may update this Program from time to time to reflect changes in security threats, cryptographic standards, CA/Browser Forum requirements, browser and operating-system root program policies, application requirements, user needs and operational experience.

  • Zotrus will publish or otherwise communicate material updates to this Program, including the effective date where applicable.
  • CAs participating in the Program are responsible for monitoring Program updates and ensuring that their certificate services, CP/CPS, certificate profiles and operational practices remain compliant.
  • Where an update introduces a new requirement or changes an existing requirement, Zotrus may specify a transition period, implementation deadline or exception process.
  • Zotrus may issue technical notices, implementation guidance or interim requirements for specific algorithms, certificate purposes, Trust Bits or application ecosystems.
  • If a CA cannot meet an updated requirement, it must notify Zotrus and provide an explanation and remediation plan. Zotrus may determine whether a transition arrangement is appropriate.
  • The latest version of the Program published or formally communicated by Zotrus supersedes previous versions from its stated effective date, unless otherwise specified.

This Program is maintained by Zotrus. Questions, applications, incident reports and requests for clarification should be submitted through the contact channels designated on the Zotrus website or in the relevant application materials.